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Abstract
In the article we will try to define a credit default swap (CDS), while paying attention to the
comparison of CDS with the insurance product. In the next section we will describe the
developments in 5 year CDS prices of selected countries, with particular focus on Portugal.
Also, we will realize a comparison of CDS and we will point out the development in prices
of 5Y CDS in 2012, as well as their practical interpretation.
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Introduction
The financial crisis, which has gradually grown in the geographical area of
Europe into debt crisis, left nobody in doubt. Its real power could have been tested
by a number of countries, to which analysts at the financial markets attributed tight
marking "PIIGS". The impact of the debt crisis is felt mainly in Greece, however,
according to the signals of 5Y CDS it is questionable whether the effect of the debt
crisis won’t affect also Portugal, which similarly as Greece would have to proceed
to write-off of a part of its debt, for which would of course first suffer again mainly
private investors, just as was the case of Greece.
1. Definition of credit default swap
Credit default swap (CDS), is a bilateral contract, within which the buyer
of credit  protection  pays the  seller  a  series  of  payments  and  on  the  contrary
receives from the seller fulfillment at that point when, in case of credit instrument
(bond, loan), to which CDS is bound, a credit event arises. As basic credit event
can be regarded for example outstanding bond or loan. Another option in practice
is a situation when  a  credit  instrument  goes  through  restructuring  (maturity
extension  of  bond  or  loan),  or a  situation  when  there occurs  a reduction  in
investment rating.
CDS is very often compared to insurance – the buyer of insurance pays a
predetermined price and receives insurance benefits in case of insurance event.
This logic cannot be applied in a generalized way, because between the CDS and
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· The buyer of CDS does not have to own the underlying instrument,
e. g. bond. If the topic of discussion was moved one step forward, in case of a
credit event the buyer does not have to suffer any damage. CDS can be purchased
at the financial market as a purely speculative investment instrument, without the
buyer having any real exposure of the underlying asset (in this case we talk about
"naked" credit default swap). In case of taking out an insurance it is required that
the buyer actually owns the asset on which he/she is buying the insurance (it would
be hard to take out an insurance on car, without really owning it),
· The  seller  of  CDS does  not  have  to  be a  regulated  entity,  the
insurance company as an important financial market entity is subject to regulation,
· The seller of CDS does not have to create any reserve funds in
comparison to the insurance company,
· Insurance companies cover the risk of insurance claims by making
reserves that are based on probability tables. Traders with CDS manage their risk
most commonly in the form of reverse transactions, within which they secure their
exposure  in  a  CDS through  the  opposite  position  in  the  same  underlying
instrument,
· In case of insurance products it is required to uncover all the risks,
in case of CDS the requirement in question does not exist. It is this fact that proved
to be indispensable at the moment of emergence of problems of the U.S. insurance
company AIG, which acted as counterparty to a considerable number of buyers of
CDS contracts, who at one point asked to pay out their claims from credit events.
In  case  the  state would  not intervene  and would  not  help  the  world's  largest
insurance  company  with  a  financial  injection  of 182.5  billion. USD,  the
consequences would be extremely harmful not only to the U.S. economy, but also
to the global economy.
1. Development of 5 year CDS of Portugal and selected countries
The last agreement on debt write-off of private creditors in the amount of
75% creates, in our opinion, justifiable market concerns, that after Greece also
creditors  of  Portugal  will  have to  write  off  a part  of  their  investments.  The
investors at the financial markets point to the similarity of the development of debt,
poor economic performance and problem of competitiveness of the Greek as well
as the Portuguese economy, which "push" the yields of Portuguese bonds and 5
year CDS contracts to historical highs. Interestingly, by 15
th March 2012 the yield
of Portuguese 10-year bonds exceeded staggering 15 %. After Greece, this is the
second highest yield in the euro zone and what we consider also to be interesting is
the fact, that the present yield is by more than 8 times higher when compared with
yield of  10-year  German  government  bonds  (the  so-called  „bunds“)  with  yield
moving at the level of 1.85%. By 15
th April 2012 the yield of 5 year Portuguese
debt attacked the 20% threshold; therefore, it is questionable whether Portugal will
be able to return to financial market and to refinance its debt at reasonable interest
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In this context, it is clear that the price of insurance in the form of 5 year
Portuguese CDS contracts is also increasing, which by 15
th March 2012 showed a
68 %  probability  of  bankruptcy. Since  the  reduction  of  the  rating by  the  S&P
agency on Friday 13th January 2012, the Portuguese bonds were the ones, which
yields  required  by the investors have  been permanently  increasing. In  an
accompanying  report  the  S&P  stated  an assumption,  that  creditors  of  Portugal
could lose  in the  future 50% of their  investments,  which caused  panic  at  the
Portuguese debt market. It is logical that also the ECB, which has increased the
volumes of purchases at the secondary market with a sole purpose – to reduce the
historically high interest yields of Portuguese debt, is aware of the seriousness of
the situation.
The Portuguese  economy  will  decrease  by approximately  3%  this  year
according to the IMF. The Portuguese debt has reached 162 billion euros and this
year it should exceed the 100% level of GDP, while the forecasts say that it should
culminate in 2013, when the debt should reach 106.8% level of GDP. Portugal will
have to borrow 17.4 billion euros at the financial market in 2012. To refinance its
needs, it prefers  currently  mainly issues  of  short-term  maturity Treasury bills,
which it issues for 3, 6 and 12 months. Questionable is, however, the amount of
yield  required  by  the  investors, which  moves, e.g. in comparison with  also
problematic Spain, at 1.5-fold levels (e.g. yield of Portuguese 1Y bills reached
3.65%  in  March). The  yield  of  the  Treasury  bills  of  the  SR,  which  emitted
comparable Treasury bills for the last time at the end of January 2012, reached
1.793%.
Euro zone representatives constantly claim that the Greek debt write-off is
unique and no other write-off will be realized. The March growth of insurance
prices for 5 year Portuguese CDS shows, however, that except for Greece a similar
way  of  write-off  could  undergo  also  the  Portuguese  government,  as  Portugal's
current problem is not a short-term debt, but state of the economy to long-term
debt, what clearly demonstrates the Portugal's failure to fully return to the debt
market by the already mentioned year 2013. We believe that after considering the
stated facts, Portugal will need during 2012 additional financial support as in the
case of Greece.
As regards price developments of 5 year credit default swaps of Portugal
since the beginning of 2012 - we note one critical negative fact. While since the
beginning  of  the  year, the  price of 5Y  CDS  in case  of  Portugal has  risen  by
15.84%, in case of other closely observed EU countries and selected main world
economies, the CDS prices have been falling. The exception, especially in March,
became the rising price of Spanish 5Y CDS (table 1).Studia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                                 Economics Series  Vol 22 Issue 2/2012
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Table 1: Development of 5 year CDS prices of Portugal and selected countries
Country
5Y CDS by
15.3.2012
5Y CDS  at the
end of 2011
5 YCDS at the
end of 2010 % change 2012
Belgium 230,83 310,66 222,09 -25,70%
Finland 63,17 77,50 33,59 -18,49%
France 179,50 219,85 107,89 -18,35%
Ireland 623,13 724,37 608,65 -13,98%
Iceland 243,19 316,63 265,03 -23,19%
Italy 384,25 484,35 239,87 -20,67%
Germany 75,50 102,17 59,31 -26,10%
Netherlands 96,69 118,50 63,00 -18,41%
Norway 27,74 44,85 23,15 -38,15%
Portugal 1 253,22 1 081,87 500,97 15,84%
Austria 166,83 186,04 100,59 -10,33%
Greece 25 422,81 8 786,39 1 010,00 189,34%
Spain 416,25 380,35 350,00 9,44%
Sweden 48,63 77,50 34,01 -37,25%
Switzerland 41,04 67,81 40,47 -39,48%
Great
Britain 62,33 97,50 73,50 -36,07%
V4 X X X X
Czech
Republic 120,67 172,75 91,20 -30,15%
Hungary 520,25 635,00 378,22 -18,07%
Poland 178,40 280,54 144,13 -36,41%
Slovakia 237,55 300,40 82,19 -20,92%
G7 X X X X
Japan 108,43 143,22 72,00 -24,23%
USA 33,18 48,97 41,50 -32,24%
Source: Self-processed according to Reuters
By 15
th March 2012 the Irish 5Y CDS fell by 14% in comparison with the
end of 2011, the Belgian by 25.70%, situation is stabilizing also in case of French
5Y  CDS,  which decreased  by 18.35% in  the same  period,  and  the Italian  by
20.67%. Under  the  pressure  of  the  financial  markets  during  March  are  getting
particularly Spanish 5Y CDS, what indicates their 9.44% increase of expenses on
insurance of debt for investors when compared to the end of 2011, mainly due to
the published deficit of Spain in 2011, which reached 8.5% of GDP - well above
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In the Central European area the prices of 5 year CDS declined as well, for
example, the Czech by 30.15%, the Austrian by 10.33%, the Polish by 36.41%, the
Hungarian by 18.07%, and the Slovak by 20.92%. On the contrary, Greek 5Y CDS
rose to astronomical numbers, specifically by 189.34%, which was due mainly to
Greek  debt  restructuring. Personally,  we  were  surprised  by  the  drop  of  the
Hungarian 5Y CDS, given the problems of the Orban government. We are also
surprised by the relatively negative position of the 5Y CDS in Slovakia, which was
largely, in our opinion, affected by the March early parliamentary elections. The
attached table 1  shows  that by  15
th  March  2012 the  investors’  insurance  costs
decreased for all in the  table  stated  government  bonds besides the Greek,
Portuguese and Spanish government bonds, where on the contrary the cost of
insurance increased.
What the stated fact in practice means? For example, insurance costs of
Spanish government bonds in nominal value of 10 billion euros in the form of 5Y
CDS rose by 15
th March 2012 in comparison with the end of 2011 from the level of
380 350 euros/year (3.80%) to current 416 250 euros/year (4.16%), however,
despite this fact in comparison with the end of 2010 this represents a more than 5-
fold increase of costs. We can also state that investors’ insurance costs of Irish
government bonds in nominal value of 10 billion euros in the form of 5Y CDS
have decreased from 724 370 euros/ year (7.24%) at the end of 2011 to the present
623 130 euros/year (6.23%), while for example in January 2008 insurance costs
represented only 23 000 euros/year (0.23%). Interestingly, by 20
th June 2011 the
price  of  5  year  CDS  on German  government  bonds  reached  the  level  of 42
basilar points, i.e. in case the investors investing in German government bonds
wanted to insure the risk of default on these bonds from the side of FRG in the
nominal value of € 10 million, they have been forced to make funds in the amount
of 42 000 euros/year (0.42%) through financial innovation of CDS. By 15
th March
2012 the cost of insurance increased by nearly 80% to current 75 500 euros/year
(0.75%). In case of the Slovak Republic the price of 5 year CDS on the Slovak
government bonds reached by 20
th June 2011 the level of 93 basilar points, what
represented for investors investing in the Slovak government bonds the insurance
cost  of  credit  risk  through  CDS the  amount of 93  000  euros/year  (0.93%).
However, by 15
th March 2012, these costs represent 237 550 euros/year (2.37%),
what  represents  a  2.5-fold  increase  in  insurance  costs  of Slovak  debt. As  for
Portugal itself, here the situation has developed in a negative direction, as we have
mentioned before, and the insurance costs of Portuguese debt by 15
th March 2012
in comparison with the end of 2011 increased by 15.84% from the level of 1 081
870 euros/year (10.81%) to current 253 220 euros/year (12.53%). From table 1 it is
clear that by 15
th March 2012 on an imaginary winner’s rostrum would be placed
Norway with insurance cost of debt through 5Y CDS in the amount of 27 740
euros/year, the USA with costs of 33 180 euros/year and Switzerland with total
costs  of 41 040 euros/year.  A  relatively strong position  and hence  a  high
confidence  of investors  to repayment  of their  debt show especially  northern
countries, i.e. the previously mentioned Norway and also Sweden and Finland.Studia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                                 Economics Series  Vol 22 Issue 2/2012
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It  is  logical  that investors’  total  revenues  from the ownership  of
government bonds of individual countries are reduced by the mentioned issuer’s
insurance costs of credit risk and therefore, in case of rising insurance costs of
credit risk through CDS, investors require higher yields when buying government
bonds of individual countries, thereby creating upward pressure on interest costs.
Conclusion
In  the  second  half  of  2011,  we  witnessed  again  large-scale  turbulence
especially at the market of European debt. Interest expenses on debt refinancing
increased disproportionately in almost all European countries, which culminated
even in the lack of interest of investors to buy the European debt. American rating
agency S&P also responded to the stated facts and in January 2012 decreased the
ratings of 9 countries of the Euro bloc. The turbulence was, in our opinion, quite
successfully eliminated at the  end  of  2011,  mainly  due  to  500  billion euros
provided by the ECB to the European banks for 3 years within the LTRO at a fixed
interest rate of 1% and to the quieting of the overall situation has also contributed
the second LTRO realized at the end of February, within which the ECB gave
banks for 3 years liquidity of 530 billion at a fixed rate of 1%. Despite this fact, in
March 2012 interest expenses as well as the 5 year prices of CDS of three Euro
bloc countries, i.e. Greece, Portugal and Spain, continued to grow. These countries
are facing problematic situation and are under pressure of financial markets. How
this will end, especially for Portugal and Spain, only time will tell.
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